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Deterministic Secure Direct Communication Using Entanglement
Kim Bostro¨m, Timo Felbinger
Institut fu¨r Physik, Universita¨t Potsdam, 14469 Potsdam, Germany
A novel secure communication protocol is presented, based on an entangled pair of qubits and
allowing asymptotically secure key distribution and quasi-secure direct communication. Since the
information is transferred in a deterministic manner, no qubits have to be discarded. The transmis-
sion of information is instantaneous, i.e. the information can be decoded during the transmission.
The security against arbitrary eavesdropping attacks is provided. In case of eavesdropping attacks
with full information gain, the detection rate is 50% per control transmission. The experimen-
tal realization of the protocol is feasible with relatively small effort, which also makes commercial
applications conceivable.
Introduction.— Cryptographic schemes based on quan-
tum mechanics are usually non-deterministic [1, 2, 3].
Alice, the sender, can encode a classical bit into a quan-
tum state, which is then sent to Bob, but she cannot
determine the bit value that Bob will finally decode. In-
spite of that, such non-deterministic communication can
be used to establish a shared secret key between Alice
and Bob, consisting of a sequence of random bits. This
secret key can then be used to encrypt a message which is
sent through a classical public channel. Recently, a novel
quantum communication protocol has been presented [4]
that allows secure direct communication, where the mes-
sage is deterministically send through the quantum chan-
nel, but can only be decoded after a final transmission
of classical information. We present a communication
scheme, the “ping-pong protocol”, that also allows for
deterministic communication. This protocol can be used
for the transmission of either a secret key or a plaintext
message. In the latter case, the protocol is quasi-secure,
i.e. an eavesdropper is able to gain a small amount of
message information before being detected. In case of
a key transmission the protocol is asymptotically secure.
In contrast to other quantum cryptographic schemes, the
presented scheme is instantaneous, i.e. the information
can be decoded during the transmission and no final
transmission of additional information is needed. The
basic idea of the protocol, encoding information by local
operations on an EPR pair, has already been raised by
Bennett and Wiesner [5]. In our protocol, we follow this
idea, but abandon the dense coding feature in favour of
a secure transmission.
The ping-pong protocol.— When two photons are max-
imally entangled in their polarization degree of freedom,
then each single photon is not polarized at all. De-
note the horizontal and vertical polarization state by
|0〉 and |1〉, respectively, then the Bell states |ψ±〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) are maximally entangled states in the
two-particle Hilbert space H = HA ⊗ HB. A measure-
ment of the polarization of one photon, say A, leads
to a completely random result. This is reflected by
the fact that the corresponding reduced density matrices,
ρ±A := TrB{|ψ
±〉〈ψ±|} are both equal to the complete
mixture, ρ±A =
1
21A. Hence, no experiment performed on
only one photon can distinguish these states from each
other. However, since the states |ψ±〉 are mutually or-
thogonal, a measurement on both photons can perfectly
distinguish the states from each other. In other words:
One bit of information can be encoded in the states |ψ±〉,
which is completely unavailable to anyone who has only
access to one of the photons. As one can easily verify,
the unitary operator σˆAz ≡ (σˆz⊗1) = (|0〉〈0|− |1〉〈1|)⊗1
flips between the two states |ψ±〉,
σˆAz |ψ
±〉 = |ψ∓〉. (1)
Altough σˆAz acts locally, i.e. on one photon only, it has
a non-local effect. Someone who has access to one sin-
gle photon only, can encode one bit of information, but
he cannot decode it, since he has no access to the other
photon. This is a situation perfectly suited for a crypto-
graphic scenario. Bob prepares two photons in the state
|ψ+〉. He keeps one photon, the “home qubit”, and sends
the other one, the “travel qubit”, to Alice (“ping!”). Alice
decides either to perform the operation σˆz on the travel
qubit or to do nothing, i.e. to perform the operation 1.
Then she sends the travel qubit back to Bob (“pong!”).
Bob, who has now both qubits again, performs a Bell
measurement resulting in either |ψ+〉 or |ψ−〉, depending
on what Alice did. Thus, he has received one bit of in-
formation from Alice. One qubit travels forth and back
(“ping-pong!”) and one bit of information flows from Al-
ice to Bob. Let us introduce two communication modes,
“message mode” and “control mode” (see Figs. 1,2). By
default, Alice and Bob are in message mode and com-
municate the way described above. With probability c,
Alice switches to control mode and instead of perform-
ing her operation on the travel qubit, she performs a
measurement in the basis Bz = {|0〉, |1〉}. Using the pub-
lic channel, she sends the result to Bob, who then also
switches to control mode and performs a measurement
in the same basis Bz. Bob compares his own result with
Alice’s result. If both results coincide, Bob knows that
Eve is in the line and stops the communication. [t] Let
us give an explicit algorithm for the protocol.
p.0) Protocol is initialized. n = 0. The message to be
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FIG. 1: Message mode. Dashed lines are qubit transfers.
transmitted is a sequence xN = (x1, . . . , xN ), where
xn ∈ {0, 1}.
p.1) n = n+1. Alice and Bob are set to message mode.
Bob prepares two qubits in the Bell state |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉).
p.2) He stores one qubit, the home qubit, and sends the
other one, the travel qubit, to Alice through the
quantum channel.
p.3) Alice receives the travel qubit. With probability c
she switches to control mode and proceeds with c.1,
else she proceeds with m.1.
c.1) Alice measures the travel qubit in the basis Bz
and obtains the result i ∈ {0, 1} with equal
probability.
c.2) She sends i through the public channel to Bob.
c.3) Bob receives i from the public channel,
switches to control mode and measures the
home qubit in the basis Bz resulting in the
value j.
c.4) (i = j): Eve is detected. Abort transmission.
(i 6= j): Set n = n− 1 and Goto p.1.
m.1) Define Cˆ0 := 1 and Cˆ1 := σˆz. For xn ∈ {0, 1},
Alice performs the coding operation Cˆxn on
the travel qubit and sends it back to Bob.
m.2) Bob receives the travel qubit and performs a
Bell measurement on both qubits resulting in
the final state |ψ′〉 ∈ {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉}. He decodes
the message as
|ψ′〉 =
{
|ψ+〉 ⇒ xn = 0
|ψ−〉 ⇒ xn = 1
. (2)
time
space
EPR
Bob Alice
home qubit
travel qubit
Control measurement
Control 
measurement
public channel
j 
+
i
M
M
FIG. 2: Control mode. Solid lines are classical transfers.
m.3) (n < N): Goto p.1. (n = N): Goto p.4.
p.4) Message xN is transmitted from Alice to Bob.
Communication successfully terminated.
Security proof.— Eve is an evil quantum physicist able
to build all devices that are allowed by the laws of quan-
tum mechanics. Her aim is to find out which operation
Alice performs. Eve has no access to Bob’s home qubit,
so all her operations are restricted to the travel qubit,
whose state is (to Eve) indistinguishable from the com-
plete mixture ρA = TrB{|ψ
+〉〈ψ+|} = 121A. The most
general quantum operation is a completely positive map
E : S(HA) → S(HA) on the state space S(HA). Due
to the Stinespring dilation theorem [6], any completely
positive map can be realized by a unitary operation on
a larger Hilbert space. For HA and E given, there is an
ancilla space HE of dimension dimHE ≤ (dimHA)
2, an
ancilla state |χ〉 ∈ HE , and a unitary operation Eˆ on
HA ⊗HE , such that for all states ρA ∈ S(HA), we have
E(ρA) = TrE{Eˆ(ρA ⊗ |χ〉〈χ|)Eˆ
†}. (3)
In order to gain information about Alice’s operation, Eve
should first perform the unitary attack operation Eˆ on
the composed system, then let Alice perform her coding
operation Cˆ on the travel qubit, and finally perform a
measurement on the composed system (see Fig. 3). Since
a probable control measurement by Alice takes place be-
fore Eve’s final measurement, the latter has no influence
on the detection probability for Eve’s attack. All that
can be detected is the attack operation Eˆ. Let us an-
alyze the detection probability d, given an attack oper-
ation Eˆ. Since for Eve the state of the travel qubit is
indistinguishable from the complete mixture, we can re-
place the state of the travel qubit by the a priori mixture
ρA =
1
2 |0〉〈0|+
1
2 |1〉〈1|, which corresponds to the situation
where Bob sends the travel qubit in either of the states
|0〉 or |1〉, with equal probability p = 1/2. Let us at first
3consider the case where Bob sends |0〉. Alice adds an an-
cilla in the state |χ〉 and performs the unitary operation
Eˆ on both systems, resulting in
|ψ′〉 = Eˆ|0, χ〉 = α|0, χ0〉+ β|1, χ1〉, (4)
where |χ0〉, |χ1〉 are pure ancilla states uniquely deter-
mined by Eˆ, and |α|2+ |β|2 = 1. In a subsequent control
measurement, Alice measures the travel qubit in the ba-
sis Bz = {|0〉, |1〉} and sends the result to Bob. Without
Eve, the result will always read “0”, hence the detection
probability for Eve’s attack in a control run reads
d = |β|2 = 1− |α|2. (5)
Now let us analize how much information Eve can max-
imally gain when there is no control run. After Eve’s
attack operation, the state of the system reads
ρ′ = |ψ′〉〈ψ′| = |α|2|0, χ0〉〈0, χ0|+ |β|2|1, χ1〉〈1, χ1|+ αβ∗|0, χ0〉〈1, χ1|+ α∗β|1, χ1〉〈0, χ0|, (6)
which can be rewritten in the orthogonal basis
{|0, χ0〉, |1, χ1〉} as
ρ′ =
(
|α|2 αβ∗
α∗β |β|2
)
. (7)
Alice encodes her bit by applying the operation Cˆ0 = 1
or Cˆ1 = σˆz to the travel qubit, with probability p0 and p1,
respectively. The state of the travel qubit after Eve’s at-
tack operation and after Alice’s encoding operation reads
ρ′′ =
(
|α|2 αβ∗(p0 − p1)
α∗β(p0 − p1) |β|2
)
. (8)
The maximal amount I0 of classical information that
can be extracted from this state is given by the von-
Neumannn entropy, I0 = S(ρ
′′) ≡ −Tr{ρ′′ log2 ρ
′′}. In
order to calculate the von-Neumann entropy we need the
eigenvalues λ of ρ′′, which are the roots of the characteris-
tic polynomial det(ρ′′−λ1), yielding the two eigenvalues
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FIG. 3: A general eavesdropping attack.
λ1,2 =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 4|αβ|2[1− (p0 − p1)2]
)
, (9)
so we have
I0 = −λ1 log2 λ1 − λ2 log2 λ2. (10)
The maximal information gain I0 can be expressed as a
function of the detection probability d. Using (5), we
have |αβ|2 = (1− |β|2)|β|2 = (d− d2), and therefore
λ1,2 =
1
2
±
1
2
√
1− (4d− 4d2)[1 − (p0 − p1)2]. (11)
Now assume that Bob sends |1〉 rather than |0〉. The
above calculations can be done in full analogy, result-
ing in the same crucial relations (10,11). Eve’s task
is, of course, to minimize d. Though if she chooses
an eavesdropping action Eˆ that provides d = 0, then
λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0, which implies I0 = 0, therefore Eve can
gain no information at all. Thus we have shown:
Any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected.—
In the case p0 = p1 = 1/2, where Alice encodes exactly 1
bit, expression (11) simplifies to λ1,2 =
1
2±|
1
2−d|, or λ1 =
d, λ2 = 1 − d. Interestingly, the maximal information
gain is equal to the Shannon entropy of a binary channel,
I0(d) = −d log2 d− (1− d) log2(1− d). (12)
The function I0(d) has a maximum at d = 1/2, and can
be inversed on the interval [0, 1/2], giving a monotonous
function 0 ≤ d(I0) ≤ 1/2, I0 ∈ [0, 1]. By choosing a de-
sired information gain I0 > 0 per attack, Eve has to face
a detection probability d(I0) > 0. If she wants to gain
the full information (I0 = 1), the detection probability
is d(I0 = 1) = 1/2.
Direct communication versus key distribution.— In
contrast to quantum key distribution protocols like BB84
[1], the ping-pong protocol provides a deterministic
4transmission of bits, hence it is possible to communi-
cate the message directly from Alice to Bob. Assuming
that Eve wants to gain full information in each attack,
the ping-pong protocol provides a detection probability
of d = 1/2, which is significantly higher than the de-
tection probability of the BB84 protocol, where we have
d = 12 ×
1
2 =
1
4 for the same situation. Furthermore, the
BB84 protocol has a probability of 1/2 that a transmit-
ted bit has to be discarded due to the wrong choice of
basis on both sides.
Taking into account the probability c of a control run,
the effective transmission rate, i.e. the number of mes-
sage bits per protocol run, reads r = 1 − c, which is
equal to the probability for a message transfer. Say, Eve
wants to eavesdrop one message transfer without being
detected. The probability for this event reads
s(c, d) = (1− c) + c(1− d)(1 − c) +
c2(1− d)2(1− c) + . . . (13)
=
1− c
1− c(1− d)
, (14)
where the terms in the (geometric) series correspond to
Eve having to survive 0, 1, 2, . . . control runs before she
gets to eavesdrop on a message run, finally yielding the
desired information of I0(d) bits. After n successful at-
tacks Eve gains nI0(d) bits of information and survives
with probability sn, thus the probability to successfully
eavesdrop I = nI0(d) bits reads s(I, c, d) = s(c, d)
I/I0(d),
so
s(I, c, d) =
(
1− c
1− c(1− d)
)I/I0(d)
, (15)
where I0(d) is given by (12). For c > 0, d > 0, this
value decreases exponentially but is nonzero. In the limit
I → ∞ (a message or key of infinite length) we have
s → 0, so the protocol is asymptotically secure, just like
the BB84 protocol. Let us give an example. A conve-
nient choice of the control parameter is c = 0.5, where
on the average every second bit is a control bit. Say,
Eve wants to gain full information in each attack, thus
I0 = 1 and d = 1/2. The probability that Eve success-
fully eavesdrops 1 character (8 bits) is already as low as
s ≈ 0.039. In Fig. 4 we have plotted the eavesdropping
success probability as a function of the information gain
I, for c = 0.5 and for different detection probabilities d
that Eve can choose. (Note that for d < 1/2 Eve only
gets part of the message right and does not even know
which part.) If desired, the security can arbitrarily be
improved by increasing the control parameter c at the
cost of decreasing the transmission rate. Let us call such
communication “quasi-secure”. If we want a perfectly
secure communication (which is, strictly speaking, also
not really perfect), we must abandon the direct transfer
in favour of a key transfer. In this case, Alice does not
transmit the message directly to Bob but rather takes a
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FIG. 4: Eavesdropping success probability as a function of
the maximal eavesdropped information, plotted for different
detection probabilities d.
random sequence of N bits from a secret random number
generator. After a succesful transmission, the random se-
quence is used as a shared secret key between Alice and
Bob. Eve has virtually no advantage in eavesdropping
only a few bits, because one can choose classical privacy
amplification protocols that make it very hard to decode
parts of the message with only some of the key bits given.
The one-time-pad scheme, by the way, is not quite a good
choice, because here each eavesdropped key bit directly
yields one decoded message bit. Anyway, as soon as Eve
is detected, the transfer stops and she has learned noth-
ing but a sequence of nonsense random bits.
Experimental feasibility.— The Bell state |ψ+〉 can be
created by parametric down-conversion. Bob’s Bell mea-
surement must only distinguish between the states |ψ±〉,
which can be accomplished, too. The storage of one
photon is necessary only for a duration corresponding to
twice the distance between Alice and Bob. The encod-
ing procedure corresponds to a controlled σˆz-operation,
which can be realized by triggered optical elements. The
correlation test involves a simple measurement of the lin-
ear polarization in a fixed basis. Altogether, the exper-
imental realization of the ping-pong protocol should be
feasible using nowaday’s technology. Even a commercial
application could be envisaged.
We had fruitful discussions with Almut Beige, Luke
Rallan, Jens Eisert, Martin Plenio, Sougato Bose, and
others. This work is supported by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and by the European
Union (EQUIP).
[1] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard. Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore
(IEEE, New York), pp. 175–179 (1984).
5[2] A. Ekert. Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661–663 (1991).
[3] D. Bruss. Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018–3021 (1998).
[4] A. Beige, B.-G. Englert, C. Kurtsiefer, H. Weinfurter.Acta
Phys. Pol. A 101, 357 (2002).
[5] C. Bennett and S.J. Wiesner. Phys. Rev. Lett. 69, 2881
(1992).
[6] W.F. Stinespring. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 6, 211 (1955).
